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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain commenced by the Utah
Department of Transportation.

The State seeks to condemn certain

outdoor advertising signs owned by the appellants pursuant to the
Utah Highway Beautification Act, §27-12-136.1, Utah Code Ann.,
1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondent, the Utah Department of Transportation, moved for
an order of Immediate Occupancy pursuant to the provisions of
§78-34-9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.

The lower court

granted respondent's Motion for Immediate Occupancy, finding that
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the right of eminent domain carried with it the right of immediate occupancy.
Appellants petitioned this Court for an order granting an
intermediate appeal pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure which was granted by this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have this court reverse the trial court's
order granting Immediate Occupancy on the grounds that the trial
court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by
failing to properly apply the statutory standard to respondent's
Motion for Immediate Occupancy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1967, the State of Utah passed the Utah Highway Beautification Act.

The Act is codified in Section 27-12-136.1 et seg.,

Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended.
been periodic amendments.

Since that time there have

The Act was passed by the Utah State

legislature in response to the Federal Highway Beautification
Act, often referred to as the Ladybird Johnson Act, the purpose
of which was to regulate and control outdoor advertising along
federally financed highways.

The federal government in the

Federal Highway Beautification Act required each state to enact
by statute or by rules and regulations sufficient authority to
"effectively control outdoor advertising" or suffer a 10% penalty
on all federal highway funds.

In the event that control necessi-

tated acquisition by means of eminent domain, the federal government would pay 75 percent of the condemnation award and the state
would fund 25 percent.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Utah Highway Beautification Act does not prohibit the
ma 1 ntenance or erection of outdoor advertising signs but merely
controls their location, size, and spacing.

Upon passage of the

utah Outdoor Advertising Act certain outdoor advertising signs
became nonconforming due to their location, size, or spacing.
For example, signs were not allowed in residential and agricultural
areas.

These signs then became nonconforming and subject to

removal.

However, outdoor advertising signs are allowed in

certa1n commercial areas; areas which are otherwise unzoned but
have actual commercial usage; and in other areas zoned for outdoor advertising and related highway uses.

The Act provides that

nonconforming signs are to be removed by eminent domain.

In the

12 years that this Act has been in existence, the State of Utah

has removed, by eminent domain, contract, purchase, or gift,
approximately 80 percent of the outdoor advertising structures
which are nonconforming under the Act and subject to removal
pursuant to the control provisions of the Act.
On the 7th day of June, 1978, the State of Utah commenced
condemnat1on proceedings against the appellants.

Yet it wasn't

unt1l the llth day of December, 1978, that the State filed its
motion for immediate occupancy, which was subsequently ruled upon
by Judge Christofferson on May 23, 1979.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
AS TO THE ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY
Appellants' interlocutory appeal was predicated upon the
premise that the lower court's order granting immediate occupancy
was incorrect as a matter of law and an abuse of discretion and
should therefore be reversed.
In the absence of an express statutory provision, a condemnor
may only take possession of the condemnee's property after a full
trial on the merits of the condemnation and the resulting damage.
Some states have enacted provisions for immediate occupancy or
"quick-take" which may be granted in appropriate circumstances.
Because of the nature of this action, in derogation of the rights
of private citizens, these statutes are strictly construed.
(See,

~,

Department of Public Works v. Vogt, 366 N.E.2d 310

(Ill. 1977) and Town of Messena v. Niagra Mohawk Power Co., 383
N.Y. Supp. 2d 834 (N.Y. 1976).)

The purpose of these "quick-

take" statutes is to provide for immediate possession when delay
would have adverse effects upon the condemnor such as.increased
costs and

contractu~!

obligations.

(Vogt, supra.)

In Utah, the statute authorizing immediate occupancy, Utah
Code Ann. §78-34-9 reads in pertinent part:
The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by
affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises
S?ught to be condemned and of the damages which
w1ll accrue from the condemnation and of the rea=ons
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for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall
grant or refuse the motion accord1ng to the
e~1ty of the case and the relat1ve damages
wh1ch may accrue to the part1es. (emphas1s supplied).
The lower court erred in granting respondent's Motion in that
we court, in its Memorandum Decision, failed to weigh the equities
and reasons for immediacy required by statute when it granted the
state's motion.

The Order of the Court reads in its entirety:

The Court having reviewed the memoranda in
these matters and also the transcript in the
Davis County case of Utah Department of
Transportation, plaintiff v. Grant Lloyd,
defendan~.
The Court finds there is a right
to condemn and with it the right for immediate
occupancy. The Court, therefore, grants the
requests for orders of immediate occupancy to
Utah Department of Transportation in all four
cases.
That ruling is improper in light of the requisites of §7834-9 which require proof of necessity for immediacy.

The State

presented no proof of necessity for occupation and no proof of
damage if the order were denied while appellants submitted
affidavits of damage if the order were granted.

Simply because

the condemning party has authority to condemn does not, ipso
facto, give it the right of immediate occupancy without a further
offering of proof of necessity for immediacy and resultant
damages.
In addition, the State made no showing of any need for
speedy occupation or of any pecuniary or other damages which
would result from delay, nor indeed any showing at all of need
beyond the purposes of the challenged statute.
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Appellants' will, by immediate occupancy, suffer immediate
damage to their property and to their motels, which depend on
travelers attracted by the signs for a large share of their
business.

(See Appellants' Affidavits).

Thus, while traditionally the discretion of the lower court
in these matters must be given some weight, in this case the
court totally abused its discretion by rejecting all of the
evidence submitted by the appellants and accepted the State's
premise, offered without proof or authority, that it is entitled
to immediate occupancy whenever it wants.
The Court not only failed to weigh the relative damage to
the parties, it didn't even consider them.

The Court also

failed to inquire into the reasons for immediacy as required by
statute.
Therefore, regardless of whether or not the State is

entitl~

to immediate occupancy or even to condemn, the lower court's
decision is improper and inadequate when measured up to the
standards of proof required by the statute.
II.

IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY IS AN IMPROPER MEASURE
IN THIS MATTER AND WILL RESULT IN IRREPARABLE INJURY TO APPELLANTS
For purposes of this action, appellants admitted that the
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act and more specifically §2712-136.11(1), Utah Code Ann., appeared to grant to the Department
of Transportation the power to condemn and eliminate outdoor
advertising by means of eminent domain.

Appellants do not concede
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that this power is being lawfully exercised.

However, respondent

would have this Court believe that the question stops there and
that the State may condemn at will.

The power of eminent domain,

however, is a creature of statute and its use must be compatible
with its statutory source.
Compliance with the statute is even more important where the
state would condemn property under a quick-taking statute.

This

is true because the constitutional rights of the property owner
are more ea3ily made secondary in the State's haste to acquire
the property.
by

Additionally, considerable damage would be suffered

a property owner during the interim period from the time when

the State condemns prematurely to the time when the property
owner may eventually prove that the taking is wrongful and unlawful.
In this regard Utah law has provided certain safeguards
under its quick-taking statute, §78-34-9, Utah Code Ann.

That

statute reads in pertinent part:
The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by
affidavit or otherwise of the value of the
premises sought to be condemned and of the
damages which will accrue from the condemnation,
and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion
according to the equity of the case and the
relative damages which may accrue to the parties.
Appellants do not contend that the Department of Transportation
failed to provide the Court with proof of its evaluation of the
property value as of the date of condemnation.

Appellants are

certain, however, that respondent did not and cannot prevail upon
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the showing of necessity for speedy occupation nor upon the equities of the case and relative damages.
A.

There is no Pressing Need to Justify
Immediat~ Occupancy.

The quick-taking provisions are not merely a bonus remedy
which the legislature grants to the condemning authority.
serve a particular and definite purpose.

They

That purpose has been

stated succinctly at 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, §220(2) p.966:
The declaration of taking is collateral, provisional,
and supplemental to the condemnation proceedings,
and its purpose is to provide a summary method for
acquiring by the condemnor the title to and use
of, the lands on short notice in order that
public projects might be expedited and at the same
time preserve to the owner all the protection of
due process and to assure him just compensation.
In Department of Public Works v. Vogt, 366 N.E.2d 310 (Ill.
1977) the Court there held that a "quick take" or immediate occupancy is designed to be utilized only to "avoid delay in needed
construction projects."
In one Utah case which was brought under Comp. Laws Utah
1919, §7339, the quick-taking predecessor statute, this Court held
that a mining company with eminent domain power made a showing of
need for immediate taking.

The company had condemned rights of

way and easements over the defendant's mining claim in order to
excavate a tunnel and lay pipeline to collect copper bearing
waters precipitating through plaintiff's overburden which was
laying on defendant's mining claims.

A showing was made that

~e

copper bearing waters would produce annual net profits of Twelve
Thousand to Fourteen Thousand Dollars and that without the pipeline
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that water would be lost and the copper therefrom not recoverable.
see Utah Copper Company v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining
~mpany,

69 Utah 423, 255 P. 672 (1926).

The need for immediacy

was evident in the case.
There is probably little argument from property owners whose
land is condemned under the quick-taking provision of Utah law
when construction of a freeway or dam or some other public project
is imminent.

Frequently in those cases the State has made contracts

with construction companies so that the State becomes liable for
penalties where the State causes delays.

The State may also want

to move quickly on a project so as to avoid rising costs of construction.

In order to avoid these secondary effects the State

must expedite condemnation of the necessary parcels of land.

In

such circumstances, the State no doubt can make a clear showing of
an immediate necessity for the land.

No such showing can be made

by the State in the instant matter, and indeed the State has not

even attempted such a futile task in its memoranda to the lower
Court.

Here respondent is under no contractual obligations with

any kind of private companies which would impose a penalty on the
state were it unable to obtain land by condemnation by a specific
date.

Respondent faces no increased construction costs, because

no construction is planned.

This fact also negates any argument

by respondent that appellants' outdoor signs impede some construc-

tion project.
The State may also be concerned about inflation and the
r1sing cost of real estate.

Such concern may prompt the State to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-9-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

~ct

in condemnation matters with all expediency.

This concern 15

of no moment in the instant matter since a summons has been sened
in the matter and, under authority of §78-34-ll, Utah Code Ann.,
damages are assessed as of the date of service of the summons.
Respondent cannot show a pressing need for the reason that inflabc:
may cause damages to amass in the interim.
It is true that the U.S. Government will penalize, under
authority of 23 U.S.C. §131, the Highway Beautification Act of
1965, states which do not pass laws to control outdoor advertising
Since this state has made provisions for control of outdoor

a~e~

tising signs, Utah is not threatened by the Federal Highway
Administrator with a reduction in Federal Revenue Sharing.

Furthe:·'

more, the Federal Regulations specifically state that signs are
not to be removed 1mmediately:
(3)

Where it would not interfere with the
State's operations, the State should
program sign removal projects to minimize
disruption of bus1ness. (23 CFR §750.304).

Finally, there is nothing in the Federal regulations that
require an immediate taking, on the contrary the federal act
merely provides that the state provide legislation which regulateo
outdoor advertising and that the federal government will provide
75 percent of the compensation when the sign is removed.
Respondent has chosen to ignore more than two hundred and
fifty (250) other nonconforming signs throughout the State.
affidavit of Raymond Paschke. )

(See

This itself would seem to indicate

that there really is no need to hurry with condemnation of the
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outdoor advertising signs in the State of Utah.

It especially

strengthens the contention that condemnation of appellants' particular road signs will not aid the State in achieving some
pressing goal that requires immediate removal.
Additionally, the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act became law in
this state in 1967.

The State certainly has felt no immediate

need up to the present to condemn road signs, a fact which stands
as an insurmountable obstacle to any contention which respondent
might now fabricate as to the need for immediate occupancy.

The

act itself at §27-12-136.10 granted a moratorium on removal of
nonconforming road signs for a period of five years until December
31, 1972.

Clearly the Act recognized that the State was not

under any obligation to meet a specific deadline with regard to
removal of nonconforming signs.
The Act provides that no condemnation of road signs can take
place unless there are immediate funds available to pay the
compensation required.

(See §27-12-136.11.)

This section, too,

underlines the realization on the part of the legislature that
condemnation would not take place by any specific date but could
possibly be a gradual process as funds became available.
Finally, respondent could advance no credible argument to
the effect that the Wasatch Range has been made ugly by the
existence of appellants' road signs and that the deadline for
beautifying the wasatch Range is January, 1979.

The Act itself

does not set a timetable for the achievement of aesthetic beauty
in the state of Utah, if indeed this Act would even achieve such
a goal .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Furthermore, Section 27-12-136.5(2)(b)(iv), Utah Code Ann.,
1953 as amended, provides specifically that signs are not allowed
in scenic areas "designated as such by the state highway department or other state agency having and exercising such authority."
This clearly exhibits a legislative intent that signs are not
aesthetically unpleasant or degrading to the environment unless
the Commission itself finds that the area is "scenic" in nature
and therefore should be designated a scenic area.

In that case,

pursuant to statute and regulatory power, the State Department of
Transportation has the authority to grant and order such an area
to become a designated scenic area and signs are not allowed in
such areas.

Absent the declaration and finding by the Department

of Transportat1on after a full public hearing, when competing
interests may be heard, the signs are presumed, by the legislature
and by statute, to be aesthetically proper.

Accordingly, respon-

dent's theory that signs may be condemned without a declaration of
a scenic area for aesthetic purposes is improper under the express
wording of this section of the Utah Highway Beautification Act.
This in and of itself distinguishes the Utah Beautification Act
from other state statues and therefore makes such case authority
upholding various state highway beautif1cation acts as irrelevant
to the present matter.
The purpose of quick-taking provisions is to expedite the
construction of public projects so as to save the State increased
cost because of penalty provisions in construction contracts or
because of inflation.

The value of property for purposes of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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condemnation is determined as of the date the summons in the
matter is served, so respondent in this case cannot claim harm in
that regard if a premature occupancy is not allowed.

Respondent

faces no dangers of increased costs on a project nor does respondent fact the danger of loss of federal revenues if an immediate
taking is not granted.

The State simply can show no reason why

immediate occupancy is warranted in this case. Respondent therefore has not met its burden of proof which is required under the
~ick-taking

provisions.

B.

The Equities of the Case Weigh Heavily
in Favor of a Denial of the Motion for
Immediate Occupancy.

A second requirement of the quick-taking provision of the
condemnation statutes is that the court must weigh the equities
between the parties to ascertain the relative damages.
As pointed out above respondent will suffer no damage
whatsoever if an immediate taking is not granted.

The State has

no timetable to meet which would justify immediate occupancy.
On the other hand, appellants will suffer irreparable harm
if the state is allowed to remove appellants' advertising signs.
First of all, the physical components of the signs--lumber,
metal, and paint--are expensive.

Appellants' signs will be

damaged in removal and storage, and possibly reinstallation.
Secondly, these road signs are the only means of immediate
information to the traveling public as to the location of appellant's motels.

Appellants will lose revenues from members of the

traveling public who are unable to find the motel or who are
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unaware of it because the State has been granted an order of
immediate occupancy.

Appellants depend to a great extent upon

these road signs for a continuation of their businesses.
affidavits of Appellants).

(See

In the event that the road signs are

ultimately condemned and removed as a result of a ruling

favor~le

to the Department of Transportation in the main condemnation
suit, appellants will be forced, at great expense of time and
money, to find alternative means of informing the traveling
public of the existence of their motels.

The fact that this

result may ultimately occur, however, should not work to the
State's advantage in its attempt to condemn the road signs
prematurely through the quick-taking procedure.

Appellants

should not be made to suffer hardship as a result of action by
the State until it is absolutely clear that the State's doings
are sanctioned by the law and this Court and then only after a
proper showing at trial.
One area of the law which requires a court to balance the
equities between the parties is with regard to preliminary
injunctions.

The courts frequently use the "balance of hardship"

test as defined in Ohio Oil Company v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815,
49 s.ct. 256, 73 1. Ed. 972 (1929):
Where the questions presented by an application for an interlocutory injunction are
grave, and the injury to the moving party will
be certain and irreparable if the application
be denied and the final decree be in his
favor, while if the injunction be granted the
injury to the opposing party, even if the
final decree be in his favor, will be inconsiderable, or may be adequately indemnified by
a bond, the injunction usually will be granted.
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If appellants had sought a preliminary injunction in this matter
to prevent the State from proceeding with the condemnation of the
outdoor advertising signs, the trial court would have been called
upon to balance the equities of the case just as it is called upon
now under §78-34-9, Utah Code Ann., the quick-taking provision.
If the court were to apply the "balance of hardship" test, cited
~ove,

the court would see that appellants have presented grave

~estions

by their Answer as to the constitutionality of the Utah

outdoor Advertising Act.

The injury to appellants, if immediate

occupancy is allowed, has been outlined above.

And finally it has

been shown that the State will suffer no injury by having to wait
for a complete airing of the matter in a trial.
Another principle in balancing the equities is that, where
the preliminary injunction will have the effect of giving the
movant what he ultimately seeks in the lawsuit, the court will not
grant the preliminary injunction.

Such a situation arose in

Simpson v. Petroleum, Inc., 548 P.2d 1 (Wyo., 1976).

In that case

the moving party sought a preliminary injunction to restrain
defendants from inhibiting plaintiff's paving a 4-mile ranch road.
Defendants claimed a violation of a surface damage agreement and
advanced the argument that paving the road was injurious to their
ranching operations.

The trial court granted the preliminary

injunction, but the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed on the principle
lliat the injunction would allow the plaintiff to proceed with the
Paving without the necessity of going to trial on the matter.
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An analogous situation is presented in the instant matter.
If the Department of Transportation is allowed to have immediate

occupancy of appellants' outdoor advertising signs, then respondent
will have achieved its ultimate goal in this lawsuit without
having had to withstand the challenges set forth by appellants'
Answer.

Appellants meantime will be without their signs and will

encounter great expense and loss of income if they ultimately
triumph on the condemnation issue and are allowed to put their
signs back up.

It seems inherently unfair to allow the State the

spoils of a conquest without requiring it to garner the victory.
The equities of this case weigh heavily in favor of appellants
in that, if the order for immediate occupancy is affirmed appellants will suffer irreparable damage.

Whereas, on the other hand,

if the order is reversed, respondent will suffer no injury whatsoever.
I I I.

AN ORDER FOR IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY SHOULD NOT
ISSUE ABSENT A THOROUGH DETERMINATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE ACT.
Appellants have raised a number of constitutional issues in
their Answers to the condemnation complaint.

These questions of

law and fact can be properly decided by this Court only after
appellants have been allowed to present evidence and to make a
record in the matter.

A hearing on a motion for an Order of

Immediate Occupancy simply is not the proper forum for these
complex issues to be decided by the court.
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For example, appellants have raised a due process challenge
on the ground that aesthetic values may not be of sufficient
weight to justify a taking for public use under the eminent
domain statutes in the State of Utah.

Despite the numerous

cases cited by respondent in its memoranda in the trial court to
the effect that aesthetic values will justify a taking of land
for public use without violation of due process rights, the
state of Utah has itself never so ruled.

This Court should not

now make a ruling to that effect until Appellants have had an
opportunity to substantiate their defenses by means of thorough
evidence presented at trial.
The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act may also be unconstitutional
as violative of the due process clause in that the law is overbroad and not reasonable.

There are no legislative findings or

statements to the effect that natural scenic beauty is destroyed
or impaired by outdoor advertising.

There simply is no rational

relation between a goal of protecting scenic beauty along interstate and primary highways in the State of Utah and this vast
prohibition of billboards.

There is no evidence on the record

in this case that billboards hamper scenic enjoyment.

If the

state seeks to justify its actions on the ground that scenic
beauty is impeded by the existence of billboards, then respondent
will have to make a record to that effect at trial.
Furthermore, appellants' road signs are informational in
character.

The Utah Outdoor Advertising Act provides for the
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regulation of informational signs, but it does not provide for
their total prohibition.

The actions of the State in seeking to

eliminate appellants' informational road signs is highly arbitrary and violative of appellants' due process rights.

Again

appellants should have the chance to present evidence to the
court as to compliance with the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act in
this regard.
Although respondent in its brief to the lower court cited
many cases to the effect that Outdoor Advertising Acts in various
states do not violate a sign owner's equal protection rights,
nonetheless that has never been held to be the case in Utah.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that most of those cases
which respondent cites are cases from eastern jurisdictions.
Each act is different in each state.

Respondent has not shown

that the acts upheld in other jurisdictions are like the Utah
law in pertinent respects.

Each act must be examined in the

context of the suit in which it was brought.
Additionally the geographic and geophysical nature of the
State of Utah is totally unique.

Distinctions between signs

located in commercial areas as opposed to those located in noncommercial areas may not in fact be reasonable as a distinguishing characteristic with regard to the State of Utah.

Conse-

quently, respondent would not be able to demonstrate a rational
basis for the Act in order to withstand a constitutional

challen~·

Here again it will be necessary to present these issues in their
entirety to the court at trial.
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More importantly, 1n this case there may be infringement of
a fundamental right--the right to free speech.

Here again

respondent cited numerous cases to bolster a contention that
outdoor advertising legislation is not an unreasonable restriction
of time, place, and manner of commercial speech.

But it must

still be insisted upon that the State of Utah presents a unique
situation with regard to media for communication and that appellants' type of business also presents a unique situation with
regard to dissemination of information about the ex1stence of
his business.

Recently a California Superior Court Judge held

that the City of LaMesa had violated first amendment freedoms by
its city ordinances restricitng outdoor advertising signs entirely
from the most heavily traveled streets.
s~ary

The judge granted

judgment to the defendant sign owners, holding:
This much seems clear from the cases dealing with
the subject: The control of a speech medium must
be such as to permit the message to be delivered
to those persons sought to be reached, and where
a substantial portion of the target group is
effectively screened from the message, the screening mechanism must be struck down. Since it
seems clear that this ordinance will prevent the
dissemination of messages to travelers now exposed
to such messages in important areas of the city,
the place and the manner of the regulation attempted is constitutionally overbroad. City of
LaMesa v. Foster & Kleiser, Superior Court of
Cal1forn1a, County of San Diego, No. 349300
(decided May 31, 1977).

In the instant matter removal of appellants' signs will also
effectively screen an important message from a target group, i.e.,
the traveling public.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-19may contain errors.

Appellants have also defenses based on constitutional provisions in the Utah Constitution and upon common law theories of
estoppel.

These defenses cannot be dismissed merely because llie

State tells this Court there is no basis for these arguments.
These arguments also must be dealt with at trial.
Furthermore, pursuant to 23 U.S.C. Section 13l(o) of the
Federal Highway Beautification Act, the Federal government specifl:·
ally directed the state governments that they may exempt from
condemnation certain tourist oriented signs whose removal would
work a substantial economic hardship to the community.

Appellants

maintain that their signs would qualify under such exemption
preventing their removal.

Because of this directive, the State of

Utah has failed to exhaust its administrative and legislative
remedies before taking such a final act as condemnation.
The act of condemning appellants' signs is the ultimate act
which can be effected.

There is no further and final act than

taking someone' s property.

It would seem abundantly clear to thJsl

Court that in order for the State to take appellants'

property,~

must exhaust all possible remedies short of condemnation prior to
the taking of a private persons' property.

One such example woulc

be for the State either through administration procedures or
legislative action to allow for an exemption, pursuant to the
federal act.

Clearly respondent has not exhausted its

avail~le

remedies and as such the present lawsuit before this Court is
premature and should be dismissed on those grounds alone.
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Utah case law very clearly shows that, where challenges are
made to the right to condemn, a condemnor will not be granted an
order of immediate occupancy.

In State v. Denver & Rio Grande

western Railroad Company, 8 Utah 2d 236, 332 P.2d 926 (1958), this
court upheld the trial court's denial of a motion for immediate
occupancy where the State had sought to condemn 1.75 miles of a
branch line operated by the railroad in order to construct a
national highway.

The Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff's

contention that without the order of immediate occupancy plans for
construction of the highway would remain conjectural.

The Court

also recognized that in the ordinary condemnation case the granting
of a motion for immediate occupancy is routine, since there is
never any real question as to the state's power ultimately to
condemn the property.

The Court was faced with two entities which

had equal power of condemnation, so that the question was one of
"better use''.

The Court concluded:

[T]here would be little doubt but that the
freeway as proposed would serve a higher and
better use than does the branch line. However,
defendant, having made an issue of this matter
should be allowed to meet it with the adduction
of any competent evidence it may choose to
present at a regular trial. 332 P.2d at 927.
Even where this Court was satisfied that the applicant for the
order of immediate occupancy would ultimately prevail, nonetheless,
since the case was not an ordinary condemnation suit because of the
issue of better use and right to condemn had been raised by serious
contentions in the pleadings, this Court held that the matter must
go to trial and that an order of immediate occupancy was not approPilate.
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In the instant matter this Court is faced with anything but
the usual case for condemnation.

As pointed out above this is not

a case where the State is condemning property in order to build a
road or construct a dam.

Condemnation by the State for these

t~es

of construction projects have become so routine that no court is
hesitant to grant an Order of Immediate Occupancy where the facts
clearly indicate that the purpose for which the State is taking the
property is an immediate and legitimate goal of the State.

In the

matter now before the Court the State is seeking to coTJdemn outdoor
advertising signs by a statute which has never been tested in
court.

This is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction and '

the law of Utah is not settled.

To proceed in a hasty manner and

in contravention of State v. Denver

& Rio Grande, supra, would be

to deny appellants an opportunity to advance serious arguments to
test the validity of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Department of Transportation made no showing of
immediate need for condemnation of appellants' outdoor advertising '
signs.

Quick-taking provisions are designed to allow the State to

acquire land for which it has immediate need during a period when
the question of compensation for the land is being litigated in
court.

Where serious questions as to the right to condemn the land~·,

in the first instance are raised by the owner, Utah case law clearly
indicates that an Order for Immediate Occupancy is not appropriate.

I

I
I
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Appellants raised serious questions as to the right of the
state to condemn outdoor advertising signs under the Utah Outdoor
Advertising Act.

The State will suffer no harm by having to wait

until a final adjudication of all constitutional challenges is
arrived at before it is allowed to occupy and remove the outdoor
signs.

Appellants on the other hand will suffer damages if the

signs are removed immediately.
For the foregoing reasons appellants respectfully request that
this court reverse the Order of Immediate Occupancy granted .t:-·· the
lower court.
DATED this

~~~ay

of November, 1979.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellants was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Robert B. Hansen and Stephen J. Sorenson, Attorney General's office,
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this~
day of November, 1979.
~;I

r ~4-, ~//....?;=

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-23Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

